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1. Introduction
1.1. A Starting Point
Since the work of Horn (1972) and Gazdar (1979), conversational implicatures trig-
gered by scalar expressions are generally regarded as fairly well understood, at least
at a descriptive level (see e.g. the textbooks by Levinson (1983:132–36) and Gamut
(1991:204–209)). The class of phenomena this optimism is based on are exempli-
ﬁed in (1) and (2). For these cases, it’s generally agreed that the second sentence is
an implicature of the ﬁrst.
(1) Kai had peas or broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have peas and broccoli last night.
(2) Kai had some of the peas last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
Gazdar (1979:57–61) proposes a precise mechanism for the computation of such
scalar implicatures (similar descriptions have been given by Horn 1989:214, Atlas
and Levinson 1981:33, Levinson 2000:76). It relies on the notion of a quantitative
scale that Horn (1972) introduced. Gazdar’s mechanism applies only to sentences
φ where an expression from a quantitative scale α appears not in the scope of any
logical operator. To such a sentence it assigns the set of expressions of the form
K¬ψ, where ψ is derived from φ by replacing one occurrence of α, that’s not in the
scope of any logical operator, with α  and there’s a scale Q on which α  is the word
following α. K here is the epistemic certainty operator of Hintikka (1962), so the
implicatures of φ can each be paraphrased as Certainly not ψ where ψ is related to
φ by a certain replacement operation.1
Consider the examples in (1) and (2) for an illustration. The quantitative
scales required in the account of (1) and (2) are  or, and  and  some, all . In each
of the examples (1) and (2), there’s only one possible replacement to consider, so
there’s also only one implicature in each example. The implicature assigned to
(1) is then K¬Kai had peas and broccoli last night, and the one assigned to (2) is
K¬Kai had all of the peas last night. Since, at least roughly, anything that’s certain
is assertable and vice versa, the implicatures predicted by Gazdar’s mechanism for
(1) and (2) correspond to the indicated intuitions.
1.2. Limitations of Gazdar’s Mechanism
Gazdar’s procedure is very limited since it only applies to cases that unlike (1)
and (2) contain scalar terms in the scope of a logical operator. This would seemto predict that scalar terms in the scope of a logical operator never lead to any
implicatures. As other people have noticed this before, this prediction is incorrect.2
While the class of problems associated with negation is often discussed, the
more serious problems actually arise in examples without negation and downward
entailing operators. In particular, there is a problem extending Gazdar’s procedure
to cases with disjunction and another operator in its scope. This problem in its
full generality was brought to my attention by Gennaro Chierchia and Bernhard
Schwarz.3 Consider example (3), which looks like an innocent combination of (1)
and (2).
(3) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
As we’ll see, (3) is actually a serious challenge for the theory of implicatures. Con-
sider ﬁrst what Gazdar predicts: Since Gazdar’s mechanism can only apply to oc-
currences of scalar terms not in the scope of any other logical operator, it only
applies to “or” in (3). The occurrence of “some” in (3) is in the scope of “or” and
therefore not in the domain of Gazdar’s mechanism. Therefore, only one implica-
ture is predicted for (3), namely the one given in (4).4
(4) (3)  Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
While this implicature is intuitively correct, both (3) and (4) would be logically true
in a situation where Kai ate all of the peas and no broccoli last night, and therefore
should a felicitous utterance in such a situation. But, this doesn’t seem to be right.
If you were to utter (3), while I knew for a fact that Kai had all the peas last night, I
would think you’re wrong. Hence, in such a scenario, I would use (5a) in my reply
to you, rather than (5b).
(5) a. No, he had all of the peas last night.
b. #Yes, he had all of the peas last night.
So, there seems to be at least one other implicature that’s drawn from (3). For
example, if (6) could be drawn as an implicature from (3) this would capture the
intuition just observed.
(6) (3)  Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
But, how to arrive at something like (6)?
1.3. Contributions of this Paper
As Chierchia (2001) argues, it isn’t obvious how to extend something like Gazdar’s
procedure to cases where a scalar term appears in the scope of another logical oper-
ator. Therefore, Chierchia dismisses the entire picture of Grice (1978) and develops
one of his own.
My goal is to show that such a radical break is unwarranted. I show that the
disjunction problem can be solved within Grice’s framework.This paper makes two contributions that are of a more technical nature.
On the one hand, I show that in general the implicatures of sentences containing
more than one scalar expression are computed by forming something akin to the
crossproduct of the two scales. On the other hand, I’ll argue that the scale of dis-
junction is not just  or, and , but rather is a set that is only partially ordered by
entailment and contains the items “A or B”, “A”, “B”, and “A and B”. Furthermore,
I provide some fairly direct empirical evidence for the claim of e.g. Soames (1982)
and Horn (1989) that implicatures are epistemically modalized.
I should mention that there’s one important question that I have nothing to
say about here: Namely, the question where quantitative scales come from. I’ll here
simple take quantitative scales for granted and use them to account for the implica-
tures of sentences. See Hirschberg (1985), Matsumoto (1995), and von Fintel and
Heim (2000) for some interesting suggestions relating to this question.
2. Crossing Scales
2.1. A Small Improvement
What implicatures are drawn from examples with a scalar term in the scope of a
logical operator? One initial problem to overcome is to deal with scalar terms in the
scope of negation. Consider example (7) from Gazdar (1979).5 Here, the simple-
minded application of Gazdar’s procedure would, by replacing some with all and
negating the result (where then the double negations cancel each other out), arrive
at the result in the second line of (7).
(7) It is not the case that Paul ate some of the eggs.
  Paul ate all the eggs. (Gazdar 1979:56)
But clearly, this result is incorrect for (7)—the putative implicature contradicts the
assertion. The root of the problem is that negation reverses scales (Horn 1972:33,
Atlas and Levinson 1981:33). Replacing some with all, when it’s not in the scope
of negation, often yields a stronger proposition, and if that’s the case Gazdar’s pro-
cedure yields the right result. But when some occurs in the scope of negation as in
(7), replacing it with all yields a weaker claim. That’s why Gazdar had to block his
procedure from applying in this case.
Gazdar’s solution to the negation problem—blocking implicature computa-
tion from applying to any scalar term in the scope of a logical operator is stipulative,
and doesn’t predict the implicature reversal actually observed (Atlas and Levinson
1981:33 and others). A variant of Gazdar’s mechanism that avoids the problem with
negation in a better way is based on the idea to divorce the replacement of a scalar
term by an alternative from the computation of whether the result of the replace-
ment lead to a stronger claim. While this intuition seems to have been around since
Horn (1972), I’m not aware of technical implementation of this idea. I propose the
following terminology to capture the sentences derivable by replacements of scalarterms with terms from the same scale:6
(8) A sentence ψ is one-step scalar alternative of φ if the following two condi-
tions hold:
a. φ  = ψ
b. there are scalar expressions α and α  which both occur on the same scale
C such that ψ is the result of replacing one occurrence of α in φ with α .
(9) A sentence ψ is a scalar alternative of φ if there is a sequence (φ0,...,φ n)
with n ≥ 0 and φ0 = φ and φn = ψ such that for all i with i ≥ 1 and i ≤ n φi
is a one-step scalar alternative of φi-1.
The proposal is then that a scalar alternative of an asserted sentence leads to an
implicature only if the scalar alternative is stronger than the assertion. This is given
in (10).
(10) ¬α  is an implicature of α if the following three hold:
a. α  is a scalar alternative of α
b. α  entails α
c. α doesn’t entail α 
Proposal (10) solves the negation problem: While an implicature is blocked in Gaz-
dar’s example (7), there’s an implicature in the reverse direction in (11).
(11) It’s not the case that Paul ate all of the eggs.
 Paul ate some of the eggs.
2.2. Crossing Scales
The proposal just developed makes a prediction for the implicatures of sentences
that contain more than one scalar term. Abstractly, we can view a sentence with two
occurrences of a scalar term as φ(X,Y), where X is an element of the quantitative
scale QX and Y an element of the scale QY. The set of scalar alternatives of φ(X,Y)
is then isomorphic to the cross product of the two scales Q and Q . This is apparent
from the fact that (12) holds:
(12) ScalAlt(φ(X,Y)) ={ φ(X ,Y ) | X  an element of QX, Y  an element of QY}
Thepredictedimplicaturesarethenallthosesentencesφ(X ,Y )thatentailφ(X,Y).
To a large extent this prediction is borne out, but as we’ll see there are a few remain-
ing problems (including the recalcitrant (3) from above).
Consider ﬁrst examples where neither of the two scalar expressions is in
the scope of each other, nor in the the scope of any other logical operator. For
such cases, Gazdar’s procedure actually makes the same prediction as the system
developed above. It’s not easy to come up with examples that satisfy this restriction,
but (13) and (14) can I think be argued to do so. For (14), though, this is only the
case for the cumulative reading, which is indicated by the **-operator (Beck andSauerland 2001 and references therein) and even that might be questionable. The
predicted implicatures are shown below these two examples.
(13) The father of some of the boys knew some of the answers.
 ¬(the father of every boy knew some of the answers)
 ¬(the father of some of the boys knew all of the answers)
 ¬(the father of all of the boys knew all of the answers)
(14) 600 Dutch ﬁrms **have 5000 American computers. (Scha 1984:146)
 ¬(601 Dutch ﬁrms **have 5000 computers)
 ¬(600 Dutch ﬁrms **have 5001 computers)
 ...(all other implicatures are entailed by the previous two)
Are these implicatures actually correct? While my intuition looking at this exam-
ples is a little unclear, if I consider them as answers to a relevant question, I think
they are in accord with the prediction.7 For (13) such a context would be provided
by the question Who knew how many of the answers?, and for (14) by How many
ﬁrms have how many computers?. It helps with the judgement on (14) to slightly
change the numbers in the example; for instance, to 599 and 4999.
A further argument that (13) has indeed the predicted implicatures is pro-
vided by the data in (15).
(15) a. The fathers of some of the boys knew some of the answers, and possibly
even the father of all of the boys knew some of the answers.
b. The fathers of some of the boys knew some of the answers, and possibly
the father of some of the children knew even all of the answers.
Horn (1972:30) argues that suspender clauses (i.e. clauses that cancel an implica-
ture) like those initiated by and possibly even are only acceptable, if they express an
actual implicature. Therefore, the acceptability of the data in (16) argues that (14)
indeed has the two ﬁrst implicatures given in (14).
Now consider sentences where there’s a scopal relation. Speciﬁcally con-
sider (16) and (17), which fall outside of the scope of Gazdar’s mechanism, since
here both occurrences of scalar terms other than and are in the scope of and in both
examples. The implicatures predicted by the proposal currently under investigation
are shown below the assertion in (16) and (17).
(16) John read A or B and watched C or D.
 ¬ (John read A and B and watched C or D)
 ¬ (John read A or B and watched C and D)
 ¬ (John didn’t read A and B and watched C and D)
(17) Kai ate some of the strawberries and Hannes ate some of the carrots.
 ¬(Kai ate all of the strawberries and Hannes ate some of the carrots)
 ¬(Kai ate some of the strawberries and Hannes ate all of the carrots)
 ¬(Kai ate all of the strawberries and Hannes ate all of the carrots)For both (16) and (17), the predicted implicatures shown seem to be correct. To
make the judgement easier, consider that the conjunction of the assertion and the
implicatures of (17) entail the two statements in (18).8
(18) a. Kai didn’t eat all of the strawberries.
b. Hannes didn’t eat all of the carrots.
Examples(16)and(17)illustratescalarexpressionsinthescopeofnegation.
I don’t have examples with two scalar expressions in the scope of negation, but not
in the scope of each other, since I found these too difﬁcult to form a judgment on.
But, consider (19), which seems to behave as predicted.
(19) It’s not the case that every child knows every parent.
 Some child knows every parent.
 Every child knows some parent.
 Some child knows some parent.
Finally consider examples where one scalar expression occurs in the scope
of another. This class of examples will be most relevant for the remainder of this
paper. Consider ﬁrst the examples (20) and (21). Again I show the predicted impli-
catures below each of the examples.
(20) Winnie is allowed to smoke three cigarettes today.
 Winnie isn’t required to smoke three cigarettes today.
 Winnie isn’t allowed to smoke four cigarettes today.
 ...(all other implicatures are entailed by the previous two)
(21) Some of the children found some of their presents.
 Not all of the children found some of their presents.
 Some of the children didn’t ﬁnd all of their presents.
 ¬(All of the children found all of their presents)
Again, the predicted implicatures are intuitively correct in both of (20) and (21). As
the following section shows, though, there are certain systematic exceptions to the
prediction made amongst examples with a scalar expression below another.
2.3. Remaining Problems
At present, I’m aware of two cases where the account developed in 2.1 makes em-
pirically wrong predictions. These are, on the one hand, examples where a scalar
term occurs in the scope of disjunction, which were already mentioned in (3) above.
On the other hand, cases where a scalar term occurs in the scope of an epistemic
modal turn out to be problematic.
Consider now the ﬁrst class of empirical problems: Scalar expressions in
the scope of disjunction. In (22), example (3) is repeated with the two implicatures
that were observed above.
(22) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night. Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
To see what the proposal under discussion predicts, observe the set of scalar alter-
natives of (22) in (23).
(23) ScalAlt((22)) = {a, b, c}
a. Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night.
b. Kai had some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
c. Kai had all of the peas and the broccoli last night.
Scalar implicatures arise from those scalar alternatives that entail (22). Since all
three of (23a), (23b) and (23c) entail (22), three implicatures are predicted. While
(23b) and (23c) don’t cause any problems, (23a) predicts that (24) should be an
implicature of (23).
(24)   ¬(Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night.)
This result, however, is wrong (Chierchia 2001:6). (24) entails that Kai didn’t have
the broccoli last night. But, clearly (22) doesn’t implicate that Kai didn’t have the
broccoli last night.9
As I mentioned above the problem occurs more generally with scalar ex-
pressions in the scope of disjunction. Consider Simons’s (1998:94) discussion of
(25) (possibly the point goes back to McCawley (1993), see footnote 3).
(25) A or B or C
 not (A and B)
 not (A and C)
 not (B and C)
Simons observes that the implicatures shown in (25) are the ones the sentence actu-
ally has. These are equivalent to the claim that only one out of A, B and C is true.
Compare this to the predictions of the current proposal shown in (26).
(26) Predictions for (25)
a.  ¬ (A and (B or C))
b.   ¬ (A or (B and C))
Since (26b) entails ¬A, (26b) can’t be an implicature of (25), which would be an
acceptable assertion in case the speaker knew that A is false.
The other family of problems for the proposal in section 2.1 are scalar terms
under epistemic modals. The problem is illustrated by the minimal pairs comparing
epistemic might with a different modal.10
(27) a. Winnie might smoke three cigarettes today.
b. Winnie is allowed to smoke three cigarettes today. (= (20))
(28) a. Kai possibly ate seven grapes.b. Kai is capable of eating seven grapes.
The pairs in (27) and (28) differ in whether an implicature based on the scalar
alternatives derivable by strengthening the scalar term under the modal is observed.
The felicity of the responses in (29) for (27) and in (30) for (28) brings out the
difference.
(29) a. #No, Winnie possibly smokes four cigarettes today.
b. No, Winnie is allowed to smoke four cigarettes today.
(30) a. #No, Kai possibly ate eight grapes.
b. No, Kai is capabale of to eating eight grapes.
With epistemic might, there’s no implicature of the form ¬might [a stronger alter-
native of the scope of might]. And possibly behave analogous. However, such an
implicature is predicted for might in just the same way as observed with other ex-
istential modals like allowed to in (20) and in (28b) above, and in a similar fashion
for possibly. This problem, I at present don’t have a solution for.11
3. Disjunction and the Epistemic Step
3.1. The Scale of Disjunction
In this section, I consider the cases with disjunction that has a scalar term in its
scope. We saw above that the proposal developed in section 2.1 didn’t predict the
second implicature in example (31) (repeated from (3)).
(31) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
Which of the assumptions going into the proposal 2.1 could be changed to predict
this implicature. A straightforward way of adding the implicature to the set of
implicatures predicted by the proposal is to assume the more elaborate scale for
disjunction in (32).
(32) The Scale of Disjunction
A ∨ B




B




A
A ∧ B
The diamond shape expresses the opinion that, in contrast to other cases of quanti-
tative scales, the scale of disjunction is a set that is only partially ordered by entail-
ment.If the scale of a disjunction is indeed the one shown in (32), the set of scalar
alternatives of (31) includes the sentence (33).
(33) Kai had all the peas last night.
From (33), it immediately follows that the second implicature in (31) is predicted
to be an implicature of (31).
However, the assumption that (32) is the scale of disjunction makes a num-
ber of undesirable predictions. For one, it predicts that for any assertion A the
following should hold: for any proposition B, since A is on the scale in (32), A
∧ B should be a scalar alternative of A. But, since A ∧ B entails A, ¬(A ∧ B)
should be an implicature of A for any B. From this implicature and the assertion
A, however, ¬B follows. This prediction is clearly undesired: Asserting “It rains”
implicates neither “John sneezed” nor “John didn’t sneeze”, though both of this
implicatures are predicted at this point. One way to rule out these particular predic-
tion would be to say that, since, assuming the truth of the assertion, they contradict
each other, they cancel each other out. However, clearly any cognitve mechanism
actually computing implicatures must know in advance that these inﬁnitely many
potential implicatures don’t arise. Therefore, it might be preferable to block such
implicatures in a more direct manner. One option in this direction would be to
assume that the scale of disjunction actually consists only of binary proposition op-
erators, but that there are lexical entries for two such operators L and R deﬁned
as following.12
(34) for any two propositions A, B: A L B = A and A R B=B
Since now A is not actually an element of a scale, the problem noted above doesn’t
arise. Evidently though this solution is more of a technical trick, than a real solution
for the problem noted above. Nevertheless, I’ll assume it for now.
A second problem has a more fruitful effect, I believe. For a statement of
the form A ∨ B the scale in (32) predicts the implicatures ¬A and ¬B since both A
and B are scalar alternatives of A ∨ B. But, these two predicted implicatures don’t
actually seem to be observed. At least in example (35), it’s odd to cancel one of
these putative implicatures.
(35)#It’s raining or Kai is peeing a lot and possibly it’s even raining.
I believe that we nevertheless want to continue to assume something like the scale in
(32) for disjunction. The problem observed here can, as I’ll show now, be related to
an old, controversial issue in the computation of implicatures—the epistemic status
of the implicature.
3.2. The Epistemic Status of Implicatures
My starting point in this investigation has been the mechanism Gazdar (1979) pro-
poses to predict the implicatures of a sentence φ. Soames (1982:521) and Horn
(1989:543, n5), criticize one aspect of Gazdar’s mechanism: namely, the epistemiccommitment assigned to the implicatures by Gazdar’s proposal. While both Soames
and Horn agree that implicatures of φ arise from certain stronger statements ψ, they
argue that it only follows from Gricean maxims of conversation that ψ is uncertain,
rather than that ψ is certainly false as Gazdar claims.13 Following Gazdar, I’ll em-
ploy the K-operator to express epistemic certainty, and the P-operator for epistemic
possibility (Hintikka 1962). Using this terminology, Soames and Horn’s claim is
that implicatures are initially ¬Kψ rather than K¬ψ. Furthermore Soames and
Horn point out that Gazdar’s K¬ψ follows from their initial implicature if it’s as-
sumed that e.g. Kψ∨K¬ψ holds, and that in fact we usually seem to make some
such additional assumption in conversation. This then explains the fact that Gaz-
dar’s proposal made the right empirical prediction in many cases.
The proposal in section 2.1 adopted the assumption from Gazdar that the
procedure directly arrives at a set of epistemically certain implicatures of the form
K¬ψ. Therefore, the criticism mentioned applies to this proposal in the same way.
In the analysis I develop for the disjunction problem in the following, the point
Soames and Horn raise is an important part of the solution. I claim that the dis-
tinction between the “uncertain ψ” implicatures that follow from Gricean maxim’s
of conversation, and the “certain not ψ” implicatures Gazdar predicts is impor-
tant for the explanation of the implicatures of disjunction. Therefore, I introduce
a terminological distinction between these two types of implicatures: I’ll call the
Soames/Horn type implicatures primary implicatures, and the Gazdar type implica-
tures secondary implicatures. An set of all implicatures predicted by this analysis
is then the unions set of the sets of primary or a secondary implicatures.
(36) If ψ ∈ ScalAlt(φ) and ψ ⇒ φ and not φ ⇒ ψ, then ¬Kψ is a primary
implicature of φ.
(37) If ¬Kψ is a primary implicature of φ and K¬ψ is consistent with the con-
junction of φ and all primary implicatures of φ, then K¬ψ is a secondary
implicature of φ.
The condition in (37) rules out the case in which a secondary implicature contra-
dicts the conjunction of the primary implicatures and the assertion. This assump-
tion introduces a hierarchy amongst the implicatures, and one must ask why it’s
not possible to cancel the primary implicature or the assertion, rather than the sec-
ondary implicature if there is a conﬂict between the two. However, this hierarchy
follows if we consider the sets of assumptions that go into the reasoning that one
of these is true. To reason that the assertion is true, one only needs to appeal to
the assumption that the speaker making an assertion is obeying one of Grice’s max-
ims, namely “Tell the truth”. To reason that the primary implicatures arise, one
needs the assumption that the speaker making an assertion is obeying all of Grice’s
maxims.14 Finally, to reason for a secondary implicature K¬ψ one has to assume
that the speaker obeys all the Gricean maxims to derive ¬Kψ and furthermore that
Kψ∨K¬ψ or some stronger assumption is justiﬁed.
The distinction between primary and secondary implicatures now leads to
a new prediction when combined with the scale for disjunction in (32). Considera abstract statement of the form A ∨ B. From the scalar alternatives in (32), the
primary implicatures in (38) follow straightforwardly.
(38) a. ¬K A
b. ¬K B
c. ¬K (A ∧ B)
The implicatures (38a) and (38b) are already observed by Gazdar (1979:50,(41)).
Therefore, the result that we predict these implicatures is empirically correct. Since,
(38c) is entailed by (38a) or (38b) it’s also empirically conﬁrmed. Gazdar accounts
for the implicatures (38a) and (38b) as clausal quantity implicatures (page 59). It
does, however, seem desirable to eliminate this concept which Gazdar only makes
use of to account for two examples: (40) and (41) on page 50. I believe this to be
possible on the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary implicatures
developed here.15
Which of the primary implicatures in (38) gives rise to secondary impli-
catures? To answer this question, we need to decide which of the the potential
secondary implicatures are consistent with the conjunction of all primary implica-
tures and the assertion. Consider ﬁrst the secondary implicature arising form (38a),
namely K¬ A. This secondary implicature is blocked because it follows from the
assertion K(A ∨ B) and the primary implicature (38b), that A must possibly be true.
The secondary implicature K¬ B, which could arise from (38b), is blocked in a
similar way. Finally, consider the secondary implicature K¬ (A ∧ B). This impli-
cature is consistent with the assertion and the primary implicatures, and therefore
predicted to actually arise. This prediction is actually borne out, since this implica-
ture is in fact the exclusiveness implicature of disjunction illustrated by (1) at the
beginning. This result is summarized in (39):
(39) secondary implicatures of A ∨ B:
a.   K¬ A (blocked)
b.   K¬ B (blocked)
c.  K¬ (A ∧ B) (Exclusiveness)
3.3. Scalar Terms in the Scope of Disjunction
Now, we’re ready to address example (3) and the general class of problematic ex-
amples it exhibits: examples with a scalar term in the scope of disjunction. I repeat
example (3) with its implicatures in (40).
(40) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
Consider ﬁrst the list of primary implicatures predicted by the approach of the pre-
vious section.(41) a. ¬K(Kai had some of the peas last night)
b. ¬K(Kai had the broccoli last night)
c. ¬K(Kai had some of the peas and the broccoli last night)
d. ¬K(Kai had all of the peas last night)
e. ¬K(Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night)
f. ¬K(Kai had all of the peas and the broccoli last night)
Again, all of these primary implicatures seem unproblematic.
Consider now the secondary implicatures that potentially arise from (41).
As we’ve already seen by means of the abstract consideration of A ∨ B in (38)
above the secondary implicatures from (41a) and (41b) are blocked, while (41c)
gives rise to a secondary implicature.
Now consider K¬(Kai had all of the peas last night), which arise from (41d).
This is actually consistent with the the assertion shown in (40) and all the primary
implicatures shown in (41). This is demonstrated by the fact that there are scenar-
ios where the assertion, all primary implicatures, and K¬(Kai had all of the peas
last night) holds. Consider the following: I wasn’t present for Kai’s dinner, but
I conclude from circumstantial evidence that he must’ve had peas or broccoli last
night. Furthermore, I saw some peas in the fridge, but I don’t remember whether
there were more peas. So, I’m sure that Kai didn’t eat all the peas, but I don’t know
whether any of them disappeared. I didn’t investigate whether there’s broccoli in
our fridge. In this scenario, I’m certain that Kai had some of the peas or the broc-
coli (the assertion). I’m not certain that he had some of the peas ((41a)), or even
all of the peas ((41d)), or that he had the broccoli ((41b)). To verify the other three
primary implicatures, recall the following equivalences that generally hold: ¬Kφ
is equivalent to P¬φ, ¬ (A or B) is equivalent to ¬ A and ¬ B, and P(A or B) is
equivalent to PAo rPB. Hence, the truth of (41c) can be seen by considering that
it’s possible that Kai didn’t have some of the peas. The equivalencies in (42) follow:
(42) (41c) ⇔ P¬(Kai had some of the peas last night)
or P¬(Kai had the broccoli last night)
(41e) ⇔ P(Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night
and didn’t have the broccoli last night)
(41f) ⇔ P¬(Kai had all of the peas last night)
or P¬(Kai had the broccoli last night)
Now, it’s easy to see that (41c) and (41f) are entailments of (41b). That (41e)
is true in the scenario given can be veriﬁed by considering that everything said
there is compatible with Kai having only eaten some of the peas and nothing else.
Finally, in the scenario it’s certain that Kai didn’t eat all the peas, hence the putative
secondary implicature is also fulﬁlled. Hence, this secondary implicature is actually
predicted.
Now consider the secondary implicature arising from (41e): K¬(Kai had all
of the peas or the broccoli last night). It follows from the assertion and the primary
implicature (41a) that P(Kai had the broccoli last night) must hold. Since thisis inconsistent with the secondary implicature arising from (41e), this secondary
implicature must be blocked.
Finally, the secondary implicature from (41f)—K¬(Kai had all of the peas
and the broccoli last night)—is entailed by the secondary implicature contributed by
(41d). Hence, it isn’t blocked, but also doesn’t provide any additional information.
In sum, we have therefore shown that the two secondary implicatures in (42) are
predicted by the approach developed in the previous section.
(43)  K¬(Kai had some of the peas and the broccoli last night)
 K¬(Kai had all of the peas last night)
These are the two implicatures that the example (3) was argued to have. We have
now accounted for the example (3). I leave it up to the reader to verify that the
proposal extends to the other cases of scalar terms in the scope of disjunction noted
in section 2.3 above.
4. Conclusion
The mechanism for the generation of scalar implicatures discussed in this paper
has allowed us to predict the right implicatures for examples like (44) (repeated
from (3)). I argued that, in general, implicatures can arise from scalar expressions
embedded under logical operators, but that one must be careful when considering
examples like (44) where a scalar term occurs within the scope of disjunction.
(44) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
I have shown that a simple picture of how scalar implicatures can be uniformly
computed as the negation of all the logically strictly stronger scalar alternatives
according to the deﬁnitons in section 2.1.
I then showed one class of cases that still remained problematic; namely,
cases of a scalar term embedded under disjunction. I showed that an account of
such cases is possible based on two assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is that the
scale of a disjunction A ∨ B isn’t simply A ∧ B, but also includes A and B. This
scale is introduced in (32). The second assumption was the adoption of a two step
approach to implicatures as characterized by different epistemic quality. This result
is presented in section 3.3.
Endnotes
The ideas in this paper are a summary of my reactions to two separate presentations
by Gennaro Chierchia and Bernhard Schwarz at T¨ ubingen University in October
2000 and subsequent discussions with both of the authors. I’m very grateful to bothof them for their insights and their willingness to discuss these issues with me. Kai
von Fintel also deserves special thanks for making it clearer to me what I was saying
and how it relates to what other people have said. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the Workshop on Formal Pragmatics at the Zentrum f¨ ur allgemeine
Sprachwissenschaft at Berlin. I also thank Manfred Krifka, Laurence Horn, Irene
Heim, Ede Zimmermann, Robert van Rooy, Winnie Lechner, Fritz Hamm, Kazuko
Yatsushiro, Martin Hackl, and Elena Guerzoni for useful comments along the way.
1. Gazdar (1979) distinguishes in his terminology between the potential impli-
catures of a sentence and its actual implicatures. The results of his mechanism are
actual implicatures of a particular sentence only if they’re not cancelled by one of
Gazdar’s implicature cancellation conventions. My use of terminology in the text
therefore is sloppy, but I believe sufﬁciently clear for my purposes.
2. In particular, Hirschberg (1985:72–74) suggests that Gazdar actually could
do with a much more lenient restriction. Namely, she proposes that only scalar
terms in the scope of negation are excluded from Gazdar’s mechanism. However,
as will become clear from the following discussion and is shown in footnote 4,
Hirschberg’s suggestion has a number of problems.
3. A special case of this puzzle, namely the case of disjunction below another
disjunction, seems to be aimed at by McCawley (1993:324) in an exercise and is
discussed by Simons (1998:88–96) (The ﬁrst edition of McCawley’s book (from
1981) might state the problem more directly, but I have not been able to access this
reference.)
4. Hirschberg’s (1985) suggestion (see footnote 2) predicts (i) to be an impli-
cature of (3) (her example (75c) on page 73 is analogous).
(i)  It’s not the case that Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night.
But, (i) is too strong since it entails that Kai didn’t have the broccoli.
5. To my knowledge examples like (45) are the only reason Gazdar restricts
his mechanism to occurrences of scalar terms occurring in the scope of no other
logical operator.
6. Note that from this point on quantitative scales themselves don’t need to be
represented as ordered lists anymore. It would be sufﬁcient to represent them as
plain sets. I’ll stick to the tradition though.
7. Speciﬁcally, my intuition is that the ﬁrst two implicatures in both examples
could be false, but only if there’s a falsifying instance for the indeﬁnite that doesn’t
overlap with the verifying instance for the corresponding indeﬁnite in the asserted
sentence. For example, (13) would be acceptable in a scenario where also the father
of some other boys knew all of the answers. At present, I have no account of this
intuition, but I would like to come back to this issue in some future research.
8. These two entailments are exactly the implicatures that the ﬁrst and the sec-
ond conjunct of (17) have, when they occur as single sentences.
9. In footnote 4, I pointed out that Hirschberg’s (1985) proposal runs into ex-
actly the problem observed in the text here.
10. For reasons I don’t fully understand disjunction behaves differently from
cardinals in the scope of an epistemic modal. Consider (i), which seems to me tohave the implicature that Kai never did both singing and dancing. This might argue
that that the generalization in the text is oversimplieﬁed:
(i) a. Kai might have (either) sung or danced today.
b. No, Kai might have sung and danced.
11. Of course, it would be possible to stipulate some assumption that does noth-
ing but block implicatures from the scope of an epistemic modal; for example, one
might assume that any speaker, who asserts might φ implies thereby that, for all
scalar alternatives ψ of φ “might ψ and might not ψ”.
12. It follows from the Gricean maxim of brevity that L and R can never be
used in an assertion.
13. The following discussion is framed in terms of impersonal certainty of a
certain proposition, rather than whether the speaker is certain or not of some propo-
sition as assumed e.g. by Gamut (1991). The difference, however, is only in the
notation—I want to stick with the impersonal epistemic K-operator that Gazdar
(1979) uses.
14. I haven’t investigated how cases where a proper subset of all maxims gives
rise to a primary implicature are to be treated. Maybe this can force the cancellation
of primary implicatures that are drawn from all the maxims. Or, maybe the hearer
makes really just one assumption about the speaker. Namely, that he is cooperative,
which is equivalent to the conjunction of all of Grice’s maxims.
15. Gazdar (1979:136) argues that if a clausal implicature conﬂicts with a scalar
implicature the latter is cancelled. This is reminiscent of the hierarchy between
primary and secondary implicatures I proposed. A difference might be, though,
that the hierarchy assumed here can be derived in the way shown above.
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